期待已久的巴菲特年報在上個月底時出爐了，如同以往，內容包含了巴菲特許多重要的投資智慧。
經詳細閱讀後，我將擷取其中最重的的幾項投資智慧於以下內容中，同時也加上我個人的註解，分為上下兩部提供給各位參考。
下部主要內容：
指數型基金大勝對沖基金；
美國經濟還會好上許久；
粉飾財報的問題。
指數型基金大勝對沖基金
In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued
that active investment management by professionals – in aggregate – would over
a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply
sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers”
would leave their clients – again in aggregate – worse off than if the amateurs
simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. (See pages 114 - 115 for a
reprint of the argument as I originally stated it in the 2005 report.)
(在波克夏2005年度報告裡，我曾經主張一件事，就是由專業經理人所操作的主動投資型基金，在長達數年的時間所累積的績效，將表現落後於只是選擇被動投資的業餘投資人。我解釋道，由於這些基金都會大量徵收高額的手續費用，這會使得投資在這些基金的客戶整體累積起來的績效比只投資在一個被動指數基金的投資者還更糟。（請參閱第114頁至第115頁，我最初在2005年報中所述的論點）。
Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager
$500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds
– wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles – that would over an extended
period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging
only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard
S&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a
parade of fund managers – who could include their own fund as one of the five –
to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged
others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a
little of their own money on the line?
(隨後，我公開表示願意賭50萬美元，賭局的規定是任何職業投資人可以選擇一組對沖基金的組合(得至少包含五支對沖基金於組合中，而且是那種廣受歡迎與高收費的投資基金)，在很長一段時間後，績效將會落後只收取少許費用的S&P500指數型基金。我建議這個賭局以十年為期，而我選擇的是一個低成本的Vanguard
S&P fund來做為這個賭注的競爭對手。然後我就一直等待有基金經理人願意出來捍衛自己的職業，並且能將它所操作的基金也列為五支基金之中。畢竟，這些經理人敦促著投資人下數十億元的賭注在他們的能力之上，為什麼他們會害怕把自己的錢放在賭注上呢？)
What followed was the sound of silence.
Though there are thousands of professional investment managers who have amassed
staggering fortunes by touting their stock-selecting prowess, only one man –
Ted Seides – stepped up to my challenge. Ted was a co-manager of Protégé
Partners, an asset manager that had raised money from limited partners to form
a fund-of-funds – in other words, a fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.
(隨之而來的是寂靜之聲。儘管有許多的基金經理人已經藉由宣揚他們的選股能力而積累了驚人的財富，卻只有一個人–Ted Seides–願意接受我的挑戰。Ted是Protégé Partners的聯合經理，同時也是一位資產經理，他從一定數量的合夥人中籌集資金並組成一個投資在基金的基金，換句話說，這是一個投資在多個對沖基金的基金。)
I hadn’t known Ted before our wager, but I like
him and admire his willingness to put his money where his mouth was. He has
been both straight-forward with me and meticulous in supplying all the data
that both he and I have needed to monitor the bet.
(在這個賭注之前我並不知道Ted，但我喜歡他，欣賞他願意把他的錢堵在他的嘴上。他一直都是一絲不苟地提供所有的數據給我，並和我共同監督著這個賭注。)
For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year
bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and
compared against my Vanguard S&P index fund. The five he selected had
invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which meant that the overall
performance of the funds-of-funds would not be distorted by the good or poor
results of a single manager.
(這場賭局的Protégé
Partners’這方，Ted選出了五檔投資對沖基金的基金，這些基金的平均績效將會與我選擇的Vanguard S&P指數型基金對比。這些基金都投資了約100檔以上的對沖基金，所以這也代表這五檔基金的績效不會被單一個表現不好的基金經理人給影響。)
Each fund-of-funds, of course, operated
with a layer of fees that sat above the fees charged by the hedge funds in
which it had invested. In this doubling-up arrangement, the larger fees were
levied by the underlying hedge funds; each of the fund-of-funds imposed an
additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting hedge-fund managers.
(當然，這些投資在眾多基金的基金，除了需要支付手續費給所有購買的對沖基金外，還得再收取一層他自己的手續費。這種堆疊的收費模式，其中大部分是支付給所購買的對沖基金，而且這些投資在眾多對沖基金的基金還得額外收取費用來支付給這些假設會選擇對沖基金的經理人。)
Here are the results for the first nine
years of the bet – figures leaving no doubt that Girls Inc. of Omaha, the
charitable beneficiary I designated to get any bet winnings I earned, will be
the organization eagerly opening the mail next January.
(以下是這個賭注九年來的報告，數字清楚的告訴我們一件事，我所指定的堵住受益慈善團體Girls Inc. of Omaha會很開心在明年的一月得到所有的賭注金額。)
Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé
Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed.
I, however, see their annual audits.
(註明：我與Protégé Partners有簽屬保密協定下，這些基金的名字不可被公開披露。但是，我可以看到他們的年度稽核。)
The compounded annual increase to date for
the index fund is 7.1%, which is a return that could easily prove typical for
the stock market over time. That’s an important fact: A particularly weak nine
years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have probably helped
the relative performance of the hedge funds, because many hold large “short”
positions. Conversely, nine years of exceptionally high returns from stocks
would have provided a tailwind for index funds.
(到目前為止指數基金的年複合增長率為7.1%，這個增長率是一個可以很容易被證明為典型的股票市場回報率。這是一個很重要的事實：在這個賭注的九年時間內，如果市場經歷了特別弱的時期，這應該會有助於對沖基金相對於指數基金的表現，因為許多對沖基金持有大規模的“空頭”倉位。反過來說，如果股市這九年來表現出高的回報率，這應該會大大幫助了指數基金的回報率。
Instead we operated in what I would call a
“neutral” environment. In it, the five funds-of-funds delivered, through 2016,
an average of only 2.2%, compounded annually. That means $1 million invested in
those funds would have gained $220,000. The index fund would meanwhile have
gained $854,000.
(相對之下，我們一直都是處在“中性”的環境之中。在這中性的時期裡，到了2016年底，五支基金只貢獻了平均年複合報酬率2.2%(複利)。這意味著如果拿100萬美元投資這些基金，將獲得220,000美元。與此同時，指數基金的收益卻是854,000美元。)
Bear in mind that every one of the 100-plus
managers of the underlying hedge funds had a huge financial incentive to do his
or her best. Moreover, the five funds-of-funds managers that Ted selected were
similarly incentivized to select the best hedge-fund managers possible because
the five were entitled to performance fees based on the results of the
underlying funds.
(記住，對沖基金裡的100名經理人，每一個人都有巨大的經濟動機去努力執行他/她的工作。此外，由TED選出的五支基金的基金經理人，同樣也會有很強的動機去選擇最好的對沖基金經理人，因為這些基金的表現攸關著他們能收取的績效獎金。)
I’m certain that in almost all cases the
managers at both levels were honest and intelligent people. But the results for
their investors were dismal – really dismal. And, alas, the huge fixed fees
charged by all of the funds and funds-of-funds involved – fees that were
totally unwarranted by performance – were such that their managers were
showered with compensation over the nine years that have passed. As Gordon
Gekko might have put it: “Fees never sleep.”
(我敢肯定的說，在幾乎所有的情况下，兩個層面的基金管理人都是誠實和聰明的人。但他們的投資人的卻獲得了慘澹的績效表現--真的很慘澹。而且，唉，由所有的基金與基金中的基金所收的龐大固定費用(這是完全不必要看績效表現而收的費用)，使得所有基金經理人在過去的九年裏獲得了相當高的報酬。Gordon Gekko可能會說：“費用從不睡覺。”)
The underlying hedge-fund managers in our
bet received payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a bit
under the prevailing hedge-fund standard of “2 and 20,” meaning a 2% annual
fixed fee, payable even when losses are huge, and 20% of profits with no
clawback (if good years were followed by bad ones). Under this lopsided
arrangement, a hedge fund operator’s ability to simply pile up assets under
management has made many of these managers extraordinarily rich, even as their
investments have performed poorly.
(在我賭注中的這些基金經理人，他們從他們的合夥人中收取約每年2%的固定費用，這是一般對沖基金標準的”2/20”費率機制，他們會再由他們所操作的基金所獲得的獲利中抽取約20%的佣金，而且這個佣金在即使未來出現巨大虧損的情況，也無法追回。在這種不平衡的安排下，對沖基金經營商的管理層只要有能力簡單地累積大量的基金操作金額，它們的基金經理人就可以變得非常富有，儘管他們的投資表現不佳。)
Still, we’re not through with fees.
Remember, there were the fund-of-funds managers to be fed as well. These
managers received an additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of
assets. Then, despite the terrible overall record of the five funds-of-funds,
some experienced a few good years and collected “performance” fees.
Consequently, I estimate that over the nine-year period roughly 60% – gulp! –
of all gains achieved by the five funds-of-funds were diverted to the two
levels of managers. That was their misbegotten reward for accomplishing
something far short of what their many hundreds of limited partners could have
effortlessly – and with virtually no cost – achieved on their own.
(不過，我們還沒有結束收費這個議題。記住，基金中裡的基金經理人也要被餵飽。這些經理人收取額外的固定金額，通常為1%的資產。然後，儘管這五支基金的慘澹表現，在那些績效好的幾年之中，同樣還收取了獲利的佣金。因此，我估計在過去的九年時間，約60%的收益全部被五支基金裡的基金經理人給分掉了。這是他們自私的獎勵，即使它們的基金表現完全落後於他們許多的合夥人只需要毫不費力地(或是幾乎沒有成本)，就可以實現的獲利水準。)
In my opinion, the disappointing results
for hedge-fund investors that this bet exposed are almost certain to recur in
the future. I laid out my reasons for that belief in a statement that was
posted on the Long Bets website when the bet commenced (and that is still
posted there). Here is what I asserted:
(在我看來，這場賭注暴露了對沖基金裡的投資人其實獲得令人失望的績效表現，而且這在未來幾乎肯定會再次發生。我在Long Bets 網站上所張貼的一份聲明中，記述了我為何會有此信念的原因，以下是這份聲明的內容：)
Over a ten-year period commencing on
January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S&P 500 will
outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on
a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.
A lot of very smart people set out to do
better than average in securities markets. Call them active investors.
Their opposites, passive investors, will by
definition do about average. In aggregate their positions will more or less
approximate those of an index fund. Therefore, the balance of the universe—the
active investors—must do about average as well. However, these investors will
incur far greater costs. So, on balance, their aggregate results after these
costs will be worse than those of the passive investors.
Costs skyrocket when large annual fees,
large performance fees, and active trading costs are all added to the active
investor’s equation. Funds of hedge funds accentuate this cost problem because
their fees are superimposed on the large fees charged by the hedge funds in
which the funds of funds are invested.
A number of smart people are involved in
running hedge funds. But to a great extent their efforts are self-neutralizing,
and their IQ will not overcome the costs they impose on investors. Investors,
on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a
group of funds of funds.
(在過去的十年裡，從2008年1月1日至2017年12月31日的時間，標準普爾500指數的表現將超過一組包含許多對沖基金於其中的基金組合，如果此績效的衡量是在不包含手續費、成本和費用的條件之下。
許多非常聰明的人希望在證券市場中獲得超過平均水準的績效表現，我將他們稱為主動投資人。
相對之下，所謂的被動投資人，按照一般通則而言，他們的獲利應該是與大盤的平均績效一致。總結來說，他們的獲利表現應該是大致接近於指數基金的水準。因此，以所謂的平衡通則理論來講，主動投資人必須至少能夠達到與大盤一樣的績效表現，然而這些投資者卻必須承擔相當高的成本，總結來說，在扣除這些成本後，他們總體的投資績效比被動投資人還差。
這些收費成本全都加注到主動投資人的費用計算方程式之上，這些持有許多對沖基金的基金會有累積收費的問題，因為他們的費用是疊加在由基金所投資的對沖基金所收取的巨額費用之上。
許多精明的人參與了對沖基金的運作。但在很大程度上，他們的努力是沒有任何的效益。他們的智商並不能幫助投資人獲得比他們強加在投資人身上的費用還要高的獲利。一般來講，隨著時間的推移，投資人投資在低成本的指數基金所獲得的報酬，會比投資在這種包含許多基金的基金還高。)
Over the years, I’ve often been asked for
investment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal
about human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500
index fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have
usually followed my suggestion.
(多年來，我經常會被問到投資建議，在回答的過程中我學到了很多關於人類行為的知識。我總是建議投資在低成本的標準普爾500指數基金。值得讚揚的是，我的朋友之中，通常是較謙虛的人才會接受我的建議。)
Long ago, a brother-in-law of mine, Homer
Rogers, was a commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards. I asked him how
he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to handle the sale of their hogs or
cattle to the buyers from the big four packers (Swift, Cudahy, Wilson and
Armour). After all, hogs were hogs and the buyers were experts who knew to the
penny how much any animal was worth. How then, I asked Homer, could any sales
agent get a better result than any other? Homer gave me a pitying look and said:
“Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.” What worked in the
stockyards continues to work in Wall Street.
(很久以前，我的姐夫，Homer
Rogers，是在Omaha牧場工作的委託代理人。我問他是如何誘導農民或農場雇主請他來處理他們的猪或牛的買賣，而且買家是來自四大罐頭食品公司（SWIFT、Cudahy、Wilson和Armour）。畢竟，猪就是猪，而且這些買家都非常了解任何動物的行情。一個銷售代理商是如何獲得比其他人更好的結果？Homer同情地看了我一眼，並說：「Warran，重點不是你如何銷售，而是你如何告訴他們。」，在華爾街也是同樣的道理。)
註解：
在投資市場上，我們都會面臨許多來自各種不同領域的投資誘惑，有時是來自銀行的理專，有時是來自雜誌上的報導，有時是來自親友的介紹等。不要誤會，我並沒有說他們不好，只是當我們自己也了解到原來被動型指數基金的績效比市面上百分之九十以上的基金的績效還高的情況時，為什麼我們還不願意去執行呢？
我們以台灣50為例，若是在2013年以平均價約56.2元買進持有至今日，配息加上價差的獲利共為23.95元(配息7.45元 + 價差16.5元 = 23.95元)，報酬率為42.6%。才四年多的時間，平均每年約10%的報酬率，就這麼簡單。
若是主動型的投資人，也就是自己選股與進出買賣股票的投資人，那整體的績效表現至少也應該超越每年10%的報酬率，也就是說至少得有打敗大盤的水準，這才有意義，否則只要買進台灣50，並長抱它數年，這應該會更容易許多。
當然，若是投資人自己懂得如何執行正確的價值投資法，例如懂得如何分辨公司是否具備經濟護城河，懂得如何正確估價，再以此建立一組投資組合，而此組合裡的公司都擁有強大競爭優勢，當然，還得懂得搭配其它價值投資的法則，如此就有很大的機率會超越大盤的績效。
若是投資受限於時間無法研究個股，或是對股市不是很懂，則最好的做法還是以投資台灣50為主，但問題來了，投資台灣50並不是隨時隨地得亂買亂賣，投資人得一樣做好長期規劃，並以長期投資為目標。總之，還是一樣得去做好基礎研究。任何投資項目都一樣，都得下些功夫去攝取相關知識，投資可以相對簡單，但沒有真的那麼簡單。
這段翻譯文中有一段落的內容我覺得很受用，就是巴菲特的姊夫所說的那段話：「Warran，重點不是你如何銷售，而是你如何告訴他們。」不管你是買方或是賣方，這句話都可以使用得上。假如你是買方，這句話可以提醒你不要輕易被賣家的話語給蒙騙了，一切還是得回歸實質價值；假如你是賣方，這句話可以提醒你賣東西必須投其買家所好，找出買家真正的觸發點，則銷售上許多的問題都會游刃有餘的解決掉。
美國經濟還會好上許久
America’s economic achievements have led to
staggering profits for stockholders. During the 20th century the Dow-Jones
Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497, a 17,320% capital gain that was
materially boosted by steadily increasing dividends. The trend continues: By
yearend 2016, the index had advanced a further 72%, to 19,763.
(美國的經濟成就為股票投資人帶來了驚人的利潤。在二十世紀中，道瓊工業指數從66提高到11497，實現了17320%的資本收益，這是由不斷增加的股息所獲得的實質性推動。到了2016年末，該指數已經進一步提升了72%，來到19763。)
American business – and consequently a
basket of stocks – is virtually certain to be worth far more in the years
ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance
of capital will see to that. Ever-present naysayers may prosper by marketing
their gloomy forecasts. But heaven help them if they act on the nonsense they
peddle.
(美國企業，也可說成是一籃子的股票，在未來的幾年裡幾乎可以肯定會有更大的價值提升。創新、生產力的提高、企業家精神、豐富的資本等，這些都是推升價值的動力來源。對於那些永遠存在的反對者們而言，可能會透過行銷他們的悲觀預測來獲得收入，但願天堂能幫助他們如果他們真的以他們所兜售的預言而為之。)
Many companies, of course, will fall
behind, and some will fail. Winnowing of that sort is a product of market
dynamism. Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major market
declines – even panics – that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell
you when these traumas will occur – not me, not Charlie, not economists, not
the media. Meg McConnell of the New York Fed aptly described the reality of
panics: “We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk; in truth, however,
it tends to find us.”
(當然，許多公司的表現會落後，有些公司會失敗。這種現象是市場活動力的結果。此外，在未來的幾年裡，偶爾會發生重大的市場下跌，甚至是恐慌，這會影響幾乎所有的股票。沒有人能告訴你這些危機什麼時候會發生，不是我，不是查理，不是經濟學家，不是媒體。紐約FED的Meg McConnell很具體地描述了恐慌的現實：“我們花了很多時間尋找系統性風險；然而事實上，它往往會找到我們。”
註解：
這裡有兩個重點：
美國的經濟未來只會更好，這個道理其實很簡單，各位可以想想看那些美國的跨國企業，例如可口可樂、FEDEX、3M、Costco、麥當勞、微軟、Apple等，這些公司的地位難以被撼動，每家所建立起來的經濟護城河幾乎都是無堅不摧，屹立不搖，而且還在持續的擴張之中。還有，全世界許多美好的事物與科技，也大半幾乎都是由美國企業所發明的。所以，長期投資美國的股票，未來的獲利還是很可觀，當然，前提是得懂得如何執行價值投資。
如巴菲特所言，經濟一定會循環，系統性風險一定會再發生，但是沒有人可以告訴你系統性風險何時會發生，更不要去相信那些末日的預言者或是一天到晚放出恐怖消息的預言家，他們通常是另有所圖，要不就是狂妄自大。在過去數十年的時間，每次的循環週期裡有百分之70~80以上的時間股市是處在上漲的區間，這就是歷史事實，請問，即便是作為賭徒，我們應該是賭漲還是賭跌？
粉飾財報的問題
Too many managements – and the number seems
to grow every year – are looking for any means to report, and indeed feature,
“adjusted earnings” that are higher than their company’s GAAP earnings. There
are many ways for practitioners to perform this legerdemain. Two of their
favorites are the omission of “restructuring costs” and “stock-based
compensation” as expenses.
(太多的公司管理階層(而且這個數字似乎每年都在增長)，正在使用一些技巧來報告公司的“調整後收益”是高於由GAAP會計準則所計算的收益。對於會計人員來說，有很多種方法來執行這種技巧，他們最喜歡的兩種技巧是將“重組費用”和“股票獎勵薪酬”剔除費用支出項目。(這兩項支出若被解釋為不是費用，公司的淨利將會提高。))
Charlie and I want managements, in their
commentary, to describe unusual items – good or bad – that affect the GAAP
numbers. After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to make
estimates of the future. But a management that regularly attempts to wave away
very real costs by highlighting “adjusted per-share earnings” makes us nervous.
That’s because bad behavior is contagious: CEOs who overtly look for ways to
report high numbers tend to foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be
“helpful” as well. Goals like that can lead, for example, to insurers
underestimating their loss reserves, a practice that has destroyed many
industry participants.
(查理和我希望我們的管理層，在他們的評論報告中，描述清楚那些會影響GAAP數字的不尋常項目，不斷是好或壞的都一樣得報告。畢竟，我們看待過去這些數據的原因是為了估計未來。但是管理層經常試圖透過強調“調整後的每股收益”來擺脫那些真實的成本支出，這讓我們感到緊張。因為這種不良的行為具有感染力：那些粉飾財報的CEO往往會培養出一種企業文化，使下屬也會努力找出粉飾財報數據的途徑。這樣的結果會導致保險公司低估他們的損失準備金，這一作 法已經毀滅過許多行業的參與者。)
Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts
talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.” In truth,
business is too unpredictable for the numbers always to be met. Inevitably,
surprises occur. When they do, a CEO whose focus is centered on Wall Street
will be tempted to make up the numbers.
(當我們聽到分析師大舉讚揚那些總是試圖”製造”亮麗數字的管理階層，查理和我都會感到不安。事實上，要精準預測一項生意未來的營收數據並不容易，所以不可避免的，當預測與實質數據發生落差時，那些太關注股價發展的CEO就會極盡所能地來粉飾財報數據。)
註解：
巴菲特所言甚是，確實有許多企業的CEO會透過一些技巧來使得公司的財報更亮眼，這對一般較不懂財報的投資人而言更是難以去察覺，事實上，即便是具有豐富經驗的會計師，也很難一時就看出這些粉飾數據的財報。
我們唯有透過以下的投資法則來將這種風險發生的機率降至最低：
l 適度分散投資標的；
l 不投資由名聲不好的人所經營的公司；
l 只投資盈餘表現良好，且具有強大競爭優勢的公司；
l 不過度強壓在一檔股票之上。
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