巴菲特每一年的波克夏股東大會，我們都可以從中學習到許多他與查理‧盟格的投資智慧，這次透過網路直播，更可讓許多大眾直接觀看到兩位大師的風範，透過他們的談話內容吸取寶貴的經驗，尤其是Q&A的內容，更是精華。
網路上已有許多談話內容的翻譯版本與英文版本，每個版本的內容都不盡相同，主因是這些作者對巴菲特談話的內容在理解範圍上存在某些差異，我花了一些時間閱讀各個版本，並適度地做了一些對照，我這裡不在贅述所有內容，只取其中有關於投資智慧的精華，並針對這些精華內容提供我自己個人的見解，由於內容甚多，所以我將會分成幾個系列完成：
系列一大綱：
1.
買進大型公司的好處(波克夏投資大型股多於小型股)。
2.
優良經理人的重要性(為什麼收購Precision Cast這家公司)。
3.
知識就是力量(巴菲特與查理‧盟格如何追尋快樂)。
4.
沒有競爭優勢，就退出吧(再保公司未來的悲觀面)。
5.
適度分散的好處(網路對傳統零售通路的衝擊)。
6.
衍生性金融商品的未爆彈。
7.
持股/現金比率的重要性(負利率的影響)。
股東大會問答內容與觀察重點：
1.
買大型公司股的好處：
(版本一)
記者提問：1987年以來伯克希爾早期是很喜歡投市值比較小的公司，現在的情況好像有變化，原因是什麼?
巴菲特：我們以前會投市值很小的公司，但是現在這樣越來越難。See‘s candy 喜之糖果，當地報紙，都是相對輕資產的產業。公司成長過程中遇到問題很正常，伯克希爾的目標是提高運營收入，但實際盈利並不一定每年增長，因為每年都會發生各種各樣的事，特別是在以複合盈利計算時，對公司不小的負擔。剛剛的幻燈片應看到 300億美元可更新的資產，目前我們已經投入大量資金但不是很快能回收， 比如911等不可預料的事。但是我也投資BNSF鐵路公司，需要很多錢。所以無論大小公司，資本市值不會限制我們的投資。
(版本二)
“It’s
one of the problems of prosperity,” Mr. Buffett answers. “The ideal business is
one that takes no capital” but still grows. But most of those are not of a size
that they would move the needle at Berkshire. When Berkshire was smaller, See’s
Candies was one that fit the bill.
Mr.
Buffett has made this point before, saying he’d love to buy more businesses
that don’t require capital expenditures.
Mr. Buffett also probably doesn’t mind buying
capital intensive businesses in regulated industries such as utilities and
railroads, sacrificing higher returns in the process, because they are more
stable.
“We are quite
happy with a satisfactory result,” he concludes.
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
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巴菲特說：最好的生意是那種不需要資本，但營收卻能夠持續成長。不過這些生意因為規模太小，對整個波克夏的資本不會有太大的貢獻。這點對我們這些規模小的投資人，可就是謹記在心，因為我們得試圖找出這些不需要過多資本支出，而營收卻能夠成長的好公司，將它納入我們的投資組合之中。
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巴菲特說：購買規模大的公司，可能在收入上不會有很大的成長幅度，但它們所提供的穩定度是很重要的。這點也是相當的重要，在我所建議的投資組合，60%的部分應該持有這些穩定的大公司，以此座位整個組合的後盾降低市場風險的衝擊，而40%的部分應該持有相對在未來具有高成長性的好公司，如此才能極大化獲利/風險比例。
2. 優良經理人的重要性(為什麼收購Precision Cast這家公司)：
(版本一)
記者提問：為何收購Precision Cast，該公司前景如何?
Precision Castparts Corp是航空航太製造企業精密鑄件公司，該公司被伯克希爾收購，約320億美元。
它代表伯克希爾最大的收購，超過2010年其對美國伯靈頓北方聖太菲鐵路運輸公司的交易。
巴菲特說了精密鑄件公司CEO馬克·尼根Mark Donegan許多好話，稱他是“非凡的經理人”，幾乎“獨一無二的”。
他說，尼根的一個好處是，他不必要處理的是一個上市公司的麻煩，因為他的公司已經被併入伯克希爾穩定的大家庭。大多數伯克希爾旗下公司的經理人都表示，他們很高興，因為沒有了上市公司CEO的壓力，不用擔心向投資者和分析師每季度解釋股票的表現。 巴菲特總結說，他很想找到三到四家像精密鑄件公司這樣的公司來購買，但這種公司的主導人“非常重要”。
(版本二)
Jonathan
Brandt from Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb has the first analyst question. It’s
about aerospace manufacturing firm Precision Castparts Corp., which Berkshire
acquired for about $32 billion in cash. It represents Berkshire’s largest
takeover ever, topping its gigantic deal for Burlington Northern Santa Fe in
2010. The deal closed in January.
He’s singing
the praises of Precision Castparts CEO Mark Donegan, calling him an
“extraordinary manager” and nearly “one of a kind.”
Mr. Buffett
praises managers effusively when they are doing well. (And indeed, he praised
Mr. Donegan in his most recent annual letter.)
He says that
one advantage for Mr. Donegan is that he doesn’t have to deal with the hassles
of being a public company any more, since his firm has been folded into the
Berkshire stable. Most Berkshire managers whose companies were public before
Mr. Buffett bought them for the conglomerate privately talk about how happy
they are to not have the pressures of a public company CEO, answerable to
investors and analysts every quarter and worrying about the stock’s
performance.
Mr. Buffett
concludes by saying he’d love to find “three or four more” companies like
Precision Castparts to buy, but that the person leading the company is “very
important.”
(版本三)
Responding
to an analyst question, Buffett continues to heap praise on Precision Castparts
CEO Mark Donegan, who is expected to keep rolling up new companies.
As part of
Berkshire, Donegan has a wider canvas than he would have otherwise.
Munger says
he thinks he and Buffett are almost better at picking good managers than they
are at picking good companies.
“It’s very important that you have somebody
there that has enormous skill …. They’re reputation among aircraft
manufacturers…is absolutely unparalleled,” Buffett adds.
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
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巴菲特與查理‧盟格對於他們所併購的公司，似乎越來越重視經理人的品質，巴菲特說過，能夠找到一家連白癡都可以經營得好的企業，就是絕佳的投資，但可能面對世界經濟越來越競爭的外在條件，這樣的企業越來越少，所以相對上，擁有高超能力的經理人似乎越來越重要，因為面對越來越競爭的市場，只有高超能力的經理人才能夠使公司保持競爭優勢的強度。
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巴菲特從不吝嗇讚美他人，查理盟格曾經在50週年的年報提過，就他所觀察到的巴菲特，總是不斷的讚美他事業中的經理人，所以他總是掌握了良性循環的動力。
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如同巴菲特過去一逕的言論，他不會干預他所有事業群的經理人，真正做到疑人不用，用人不疑，這也是良性循環的重要關鍵因素。
3. 知識就是力量(巴菲特與查理‧盟格如何追尋快樂)：
(版本一)
觀眾提問：你們是如何追尋快樂的?回過頭看，哪些事情是你想重新做的?
巴菲特：今天我85歲了，我已經很高興了。今天用我喜歡方式生活，吃我喜歡的東西，跟我喜歡人一起過活這就是我最喜歡的方式了。我很早就決定了我最喜歡的雇員是我自己。查理和我都是被上帝賜福的，他92歲我85歲，我們每天都有工作要做。做精彩的事情，他應該覺得現在做的事情在92歲是非常有趣、精彩、非常值得的一些事情。我們是非常幸運的，所以我今天實際上沒有任何抱怨了。業務上的話，我想開始做這個紡織業可能是比較走錯的地方，查理你呢?
芒格：回頭看的話我沒有做任何後悔的事兒。賺不賺錢都不是一回事兒，我比較後悔是那時候沒有變聰明更快一點。我現在92歲了，我還有很多的精力會繼續工作下去，這是比較難得的。
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
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知識就是力量，知識會使得自己變得更理智，更懂得如何有智慧的思考，擁有豐富多元的知識，甚至可以改變自己的命運。人生要過得更好，不是只有知足就可以，我們得盡可能避免自己做出對自己不利的決定，而擁有豐富多元的知識，我們才能理性做出最有智慧的抉擇，因為沒有豐富知識作為思考的基礎，是想不出什麼好東西的。
4. 沒有競爭優勢，就退出吧(再保公司未來的悲觀面)：
(版本一)
股東提問：為什麼伯克希爾公司出售大量歐洲再保險公司的股份?
巴巴菲特：我在我的年度報告中也講了，再保險業務在未來10年一般會沒有過去10年那麼有吸引力。
“在某種程度上，這是因為利率停留如此之低。它使一個合理的利潤投資溢價比較困難。巴菲特指出，伯克希爾還擁有一個很大的再保險業務，但他的公司有更大的靈活性來進出不同業務。近來，在該業務中去尋找投資收益“不好玩”。
芒格指出，“很多從金融人”已經進入再保險的領域。這可能是參照類似由對沖基金經理大衛·艾因霍恩成立綠光公司 (Greenlight Re)。這意味著供應量上升，而需求基本上是沒變的。
(版本二)
Becky Quick of CNBC shares the next question.
These journalist questions also come from shareholders and Buffett fans, but
are screened to make them more Berkshire-related. This one is about Berkshire’s
sale of stakes in massive European reinsurers.
Mr. Buffett repeats something he said in this
year’s annual letter (you can read our commentary from the time here). The
reinsurance business, he says, generally will be less attractive in the next 10
years than it has been in the past 10 years.
In part, that’s because of what’s happened
with interest rates staying so low. It makes investing premiums for a
reasonable profit more difficult.
Mr. Buffett notes that Berkshire also has a
big reinsurance business, but he notes that his company has more flexibility to
move in and out of the sector somewhat. And, as we’ve noted, they have moved
away from some sectors of the business. “It is no fun” to hunt for investment
yield in that business these days.
Mr. Munger notes that “a lot of people from
finance” have come into the reinsurance world. That may be in reference to
companies like Greenlight Re, set up by hedge fund manager David Einhorn. That
means supply is going up in the reinsurance world, while demand essentially
isn’t.
Mr.
Buffett concludes by noting that there are tax advantages for a big-name
investor who is setting up a reinsurer, calling it an effective “beard.”
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
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保險的生意似乎越來愈難做，低利率的環境，過度競爭的環境，使得這個行業將會有越來越高的挑戰，所以我們在觀察保險業時，得更為謹慎。
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面對一家公司所處的產業，在未來將會越來越”無利可圖”時，巴菲特會選擇退出。
5. 適度分散的好處(網路對傳統零售通路的衝擊)：
(版本一)
觀眾提問：看到亞馬遜以及其他公司的成長，市場推廣方式上也發生很大變化。從推廣銷售到客戶自己尋找適合產品這一轉變，對公司意味著什麼?
巴菲特：你說到這個問題是巨大的一個問題。亞馬遜的成長的速率令人驚歎。 對我們而言，我們不會焦慮，我們不會想是去參與還是反對。互聯網時代對我們的幫助良多，但思考新的機會時，我們也會面臨一些阻力，但我們已經加入到互聯網科技時代，我們會努力把自己擅長的事情做好。伯克希爾公司的最大優勢是，我們不是固定在一個行業，鋼鐵或輪胎之類的。我們會分佈在很多行業。我認為，一定要具備一個彈性思維，去思考將資產部署在哪些方面。
查理：我想在零售市場裡，以前零售業是非常年輕的狀況，現在零售業肯定被互聯網影響，我們受更多的影響。互聯網能夠增加現在這些份額。這是肯定的事兒。所以我想亞馬遜這個事情並不是最後會發生的事情，大家已經都知道了。
(版本二)
A German shareholder asks Mr. Buffett how the
shift from “push” to “pull” marketing affects Berkshire and other companies.
Mr. Buffett takes the question to mean how
Internet companies have upended traditional sales business models. He speaks
about Jeff Bezos and Amazon, marveling at how much “they’ve accomplished in a
fairly short period of time and continue to accomplish.”
He
says Berkshire’s retail and manufacturing businesses don’t make any decisions
without thinking long and hard about what the next five to 10 years will look
like. He adds that they’re not going to try to “out-Bezos Bezos” because Amazon
is better at online retail than Berkshire is. While Berkshire doesn’t worry
much about it, he notes it’s a “huge economic trend that 20 years ago was on no
one’s radar screen.”
(版本三)
“The
effect of Amazon and others that I would say are playing the same game…is far
from having been seen. It is a big, big force and it already has disrupted
plenty of people and it will disrupt more,” he says.
Berkshire, however, is well diversified.
Berkshire owned department stores but never saw itself as a department store.
Berkshire’s business is allocating capital.
Munger
says they “failed so thoroughly at retailing when we were young” that they
avoided problems in the retail sector in their old age. Berkshire’s retailers
are so strong, Munger says, that he doesn’t expet them to face much trouble.
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
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巴菲特似乎不是很擔心互聯網將對他所擁有的零售事業群帶來傷害，因為他們的事業群將會懂得長期規劃與應對這個產業的變化。
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波克夏事業群擁有許多不同的行業，零售業只是其中一小部分，所以這就是適當分散的好處。查理盟格提到：我們在20年前並無法預測到現在網路商業的景象。有些時候，面對產業的變化，我們是無法提前預測的，如果我們的投資組合能適度的分散，我們將可以降低這樣的風險。
6. 衍生性金融商品的未爆彈：
(版本一)
股東現場提問：如何看待投行的金融衍生品?
巴菲特：投行是我的重點投資對象，衍生品非常危險，以後也是。監管人員未必會有辦法有效監管，要非常小心。我也認為衍生品價值很難評估。
(版本二)
Smart question from the floor on derivatives
and how to value the commercial banks that Berkshire owns because of their
derivative exposures.
Mr. Buffett acknowledges that derivatives do
“complicate” the process of valuing the banks. If he were asked to describe the
derivative position of Bank of America, he could give a broad answer but not a
ton of detail. But he says he’s not worried about Berkshire’s investment in
Bank of America or Wells Fargo.
He repeats what he’s said before: That the
problem with the derivatives is largely in the counter-party risk. A major
terror attack or some such “discontinuity,” will lead to a lot of problems. And
when markets reopen after such an event, he believes some of the counterparties
will no longer be standing.
“Derivatives
are still dangerous in large quantity,” he says. “It’s still a potential time
bomb in the system.”
Some people believe that Mr. Buffett is a bit
hypocritical for running down derivatives, while selling some at Berkshire. But
the difference is in the collateral requirements. Berkshire does not owe
collateral on most of the positions and will only pay out under extreme
circumstances when the derivatives expire.
“I’m
never going to get into a position” where Berkshire will owe money in such
circumstances.
And
Mr. Buffett concludes by saying that
when it came to 45 of 50 largest banks in the world “we wouldn’t even think
about” investing in them.
(版本三)
Warren Buffett, one
of the world’s most storied investors, has issued a fresh warning that the
complex derivatives lurking on banks' balance sheets are a “potential time
bomb” that could explode in times of stress.
The Sage of Omaha
told the annual meeting of his company Berkshire Hathaway that while he still
believes in holding shares in financial firms such as Bank of America, the
sector continues to build derivatives that could create “dangerous” jolts in
value that would exacerbate a major shock.
“Some of these
things get so complicated they’re very hard to evaluate... I know one that’s so
mismarked it would blow your mind, and the auditors I don’t think are
necessarily capable of holding that behaviour in check,” he said.
Emphasising a warning
he gave last summer, when he described derivatives as “weapons of mass
destruction,” Mr Buffett said a major event such as a cyber attack that shut
down the financial markets would trigger “enormous gaps in things you thought
might be protected by collateral”.
“I regard very large derivative positions as dangerous.
We inherited a modest sized position at [Berkshire’s reinsurance vehicle] Gen
Re in a benign market and we lost about $400m just trying to unwind it with no
pressure on us whatsoever.”
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
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巴菲特對於衍生性金融商品感到憂心，他擔心萬一出現重大攻擊事件，例如：網路攻擊重創了金融秩序時，這些衍生性金融商品將會不堪一擊，一家銀行如果擁有過多的衍生性金融商品，將無法承受這樣的重創。
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衍生性金融商品很難被監督與估算的。
7. 持股/現金比率的重要性(負利率的影響)：
(版本一)
提問：如果美國像歐洲和日本一樣引入負利率，這對我們會有什麼影響?
巴菲特：伯克希爾公司已經在處理歐洲負利率。伯克希爾有本事用現有資本“找事情做”。現實的情況是利率如此之低，浮存金對保險公司來說，沒有多年前那麼有價值。但是對伯克希爾·哈撒韋還是有價值，因為在投資方面，它比它的競爭對手更多地運用浮存金。
保險公司的浮存金，簡單地說，是從保險費中收集到的資金，但尚未發放以滿足索賠。這對保險公司來說是責任。但收取保費和支付索賠出來之間的延遲給伯克希爾·哈撒韋公司提供了一個機會，浮存金的投資顯然多年來為巴菲特和伯克希爾巨大的優勢。
(版本二)
Mr. Buffett fields a question about the
effect of negative interest rates on Berkshire’s insurance float (the
investable assets held by the insurance unit).
Mr. Buffett notes that because Berkshire has
so much capital and “so many sources of earnings power,” his firm has the
ability to use its float in ways that “most insurance companies can’t think
about.”
But Berkshire also has a cash pile (and “cash
equivalents,” meaning largely Treasurys) of tens of billions of dollars, and he
says it’s almost as painful to earn just a quarter of one percent interest on
such investments as it is to lose a quarter of a percent.
“Float
is not worth as much to insurance companies now” as it once was, he says.
“Having a lot
of money around” is a problem for companies and retirees right now, he says.
(版本三)
Buffett notes that Berkshire is already
dealing with negative rates in Europe.
Buffett notes that Berkshire has the ability
to “find things to do” with its money. The reality is with rates so low, float
isn’t worth as much to insurance companies as it used to be but is probably
more valuable to Berkshire because it has more to do with its float than its
competitors when it comes to investing.
An
insurance company’s float, simply put, is money collected from insurance
premiums but not yet paid out to meet claims. It’s a liability on an insurer’s
books, but the lag between collecting the premium and paying out claims
provides an opportunity to invest the float–and that’s obviously been a huge
advantage for Buffett and Berkshire over the years.
這裡我們可以觀察到幾個重點：
l
低利的環境對於擁有大量浮存金的波克夏而言是較為不利的，但比起其他的保險公司而言，波克夏卻更懂得如何利用這些浮存金來投資好的企業，以此來創造高的投資報酬率。重點是，雖然這些浮存金並沒有帶來高的利息收入，但巴菲特卻不會急於將這些浮存金用於投資，反之，他還會繼續保留一定程度的浮存金，如此既可與系統性風險對沖之外，更保有很大的實力可隨時以合理的價格併購好的企業。對於一般投資人而言，懂得如何觀察市場的位置，並以此依據來適度控制自己的持股/資金比例，也是異曲同工之妙。
圖片來源：nytimes
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